Part 2
T. Harry Williams offers the alternate view of the quality of leadership issue in "The Military Leadership of the North and South" in Donald; Why the North Won the Civil War. Williams' position is that the north won because Union leadership was clearly superior. He also states that the North developed a clear overall strategy "at an early date". He contrasts Grant and Sherman with Lee and concludes that the determination and innovation of the Union leaders proved far superior to Lee's more limited view of the war. Williams also rates Lincoln as far more flexible and willing to do what ever necessary to win than Davis who was set in his way of fighting.42
The points made in Luddwell Johnson’s essay “Civil War Military History” counterbalance Williams’. Johnson points out that the Union plan cited by Williams was clearly not formulated as a whole and coherent plan prior to its execution. Before Grant had captured Vicksburg, Rosecrans' attempted advances on Chattanooga were carried out independently. It was only after Grant took Chattanooga that the final strategy of "simultaneous" advances on Atlanta and Richmond was developed. Johnson also shows that the initial design for an advance down the Mississippi was not adopted until the end of 1862.43 He also describes how Lee's potential role as over all commander was largely pre-empted by Davis' policy of direct control.44
Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones' important work, How the North Won, again picks up Williams' general position of superior generalship by Union commanders in the last months of the war. They point to Grant’s strategy of massive raids to exhaust Confederate resources as a major innovation. Avoiding the need and intendant difficulties of holding territories are cited as the major advantages of this strategy. They also show disruption of southern economy and railroads to be key benefits of the strategy of exhaustion.45
Some of their other major points appear much less supportable. Hattaway and Jones state that "Lincoln had the more difficult task” than Davis in providing decision making leadership.46 Further that unlike Davis, Lincoln had to harmonize widely differing views and interests within the northern war effort. Also that "little controversy existed" within the Confederate Government and command systems. Finally, "Davis had no powerful and vocal radicals advocating their ideas and pushing favored generals".47
It is wholly impossible to reconcile these statements with the work in The Politics of Command: Factions and Ideas in Confederate Strategy by Thomas L. Connelly et al. The basic premise of this work is exactly that the deep divisions in the Confederate command system did decisively affect the war's outcome. Connelly shows in detail how just these type divisions, referenced in the negative by Hattaway, quickly became the central feature of that system. It is specifically and graphically shown that, at the decisive juncture just before the Chattanooga Campaign, the Army of Tennessee was deeply embroiled in bitter personal infighting effecting the whole command structure from Davis down to the division commanders.48 That these disputes decisively affected the outcome of this campaign is strikingly clear. In this light, many of the positions taken in Hattaway are significantly undermined.
The manpower and economic argument is well presented in Richard Current's "God and the Strongest Battalions" in Donald, Why the North Won The Civil War. Current states the prime cause for Union victory as the superior economic and manpower resources of the North. He offers the view that because the economic superiority of the Union was so great, it was inevitable that the North should win- although using only a small fraction of its total resources.49 Although this line of reasoning seems intuitively strong, it actually fails to answer two key questions. If the outcome was to be so certain, why was it apparently in doubt so long? Indeed, up to the summer of 1863 the south had its own decisive opportunities. Also, if full economic pressure was not needed could economic superiority really be the prime reason for victory.50
Further, with respect to the manpower issue three counter points may be made. First, from the number of Confederate troops that actually surrendered we know that there must have been well over 200,000 troops still active in April 1865. Second, That no more than a third of these troops were employed against the main union armies under Grant and Sherman.51 Third, that aggregate Confederate forces had been reduced by attrition no more than 7 per cent over the final two years of the war- 465,584 aggregate forces on January 1st 1863 and 439,675 on the same date in 1865.52 In fact, these very points tend to show more surely than any others that the outcome was more directly tied to military causes. Military causes because of the failure of Confederate strategy to effectively employ the sizable forces available right up to the final surrender. The serious desertion problem also points strongly to military causes- loss of cohesion in the Confederate units not the lack of available forces.
A work, Why the South Lost the Civil War by Richard E. Beringer et al, addresses the factor of internal divisions of the south as the key cause of Confederate defeat. This work cites three areas as examples: failing determination to defend slavery, inadequate national feeling, and the moral implications of the fundamentalist Christian faith of most Southerners.53 In summary, this is a repeat of past attempts to advance southern will and divisions as the cause of defeat. As with previous works, this largely fails to carry the issue. Southern "failure to carry on" an extended guerilla war after the surrender of the main Confederate armies is used as the main support for the first point.54 Yet, history shows that a long and concerted, and somewhat successful, underground effort to maintain social control over blacks did indeed arise- the Klu Klux Klan. Nor does the assertion of weak national feeling take in to account that the basic divisions of the traditional south existed largely along class rather than regional lines- and this was true during the war itself. It would be just as reasonable to cite class differences. Indeed, these were apparent though their net effect is an open question. Perhaps the least effective of these three points is that guilt among Christian fundamentalists finally sapped the will to support slavery. From many years before the war to long after, many protestant denominations, Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians, were bitterly split on purely sectional north/south lines; and resulting from causes related to the war.
“The Ten Greatest Blunders of the Civil War,” in North & South vol. 8 no. 1 (January 2005), offered a productive discussion into how a broad range of events played out to effect the outcome of the war. Yet, Steven Woodworth and Steven Newton apparently feel that Davis was fated to be Confederate President. Woodworth and other historians tend to overlook the effect of "reading into history" with regard to Davis' position. They are not able to see any "conceivable alternatives" to Davis in spite of acknowledging that his leadership was so flawed that it materially contributed to losing the war, as shown in the litany of important southern blunders. It is no more than an inevitable history interpretation to say that any conceivable alternative would have necessarily been far worse and lost the war more quickly.55 see Table
That men like John Breckinridge, John Bell, Louis Wigfall and Joe Brown were available clearly disproves the no "conceivable alternative" interpretation. While each of these men may appear to possess overwhelming weakness or flaws to historians, each was a well-accomplished politician in 1860. Steve Newton says "Brown, Vance, Stephens, Toombs? All laughable."56
We should all re-read James McPherson's Battle Cry of Freedom. He demonstrates how easy it is to commit the fallacy of inevitability and forget the "dimension of contingency" and that at "numerous critical points things may have turned out altogether differently."57 As explained by Chandra Manning, in Crossfire in the same issue of North & South, "the dangers of applying hindsight, which obscures things as they looked from the perspective of people living in the past by blocking the view either with the way we want things to have been, or with things that have happened since but which no one in the past could have known.”58 Again from McPherson, "There was no shortage of aspirants‚ Toombs, Stephens and Howell Cobb, all seemed better to fit the bill.”59
Ultimately it was a political calculation to select Davis -not fate. Woodworth and Newton seem to argue that it was inevitable that only Davis be President. Far from being laughable Stephens was selected Vice-President, a position that by definition requires a person of Presidential stature.Breckinridge certainly had personal faults, but what would the political effect in Kentucky have been had he been offered the Presidency? It seems probable that the confederate cause would have been more acceptable to kentuckians with one of their own as President. Breckinridge also had enough general popularity as a politician to win the south in the 1860 presidential election.60 It also seems unlikely that he would have turned down the presidency. Whether Breckinridge would have been better than Davis is probably not knowable but as Keith Poulter points out what the south needed was a skillful politician and Davis was clearly not that.61 What we do know is that it was not likely that the south would win with Davis as president. Confederates and Davis himself seem to have made the mistake of seeing military experience as the important quality for a president. We now know his so-called military knowledge to be perhaps the fatal weakness in Davis as President. His military meddling in combination with his political harshness proved a debilitating combination in leadership.62
Although initially opposed to secession, Bell rapidly came to support it once war became unavoidable. In the 1860 election, Bell carried Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee, the south's three most populous states, and large sections of Georgia and North Carolina.63 Wigfall was a prominent secessionist whose initial support of Davis carried substantial weight. He supported conscription and other strong measures of the central government. He gradually and increasingly became one of the most out spoken critics of Davis' military leadership. He clearly represented a legitimate alternative in military outlook and in the event wielded important influence over confederate strategy.64
Many readers may find the prospect of Georgia Governor Joe Brown as President an incredible proposal but again what seems so inconceivable to historians may be no more that the inevitability of hindsight. While a well know opponent of Davis and conscription, President Brown may have been persuaded of the necessity of many of the measures taken by the central government. His determined opposition as governor shows what a powerful political force he would have been at the head of the government. Brown's ability as a politician made him able to "habitually turn political enemies into enthusiastic friends" according to the Civil War Dictionary.65 What greater trait could be wished for in a president and was yet so un-Davis like. It was in many respects only natural that as Governor Brown take the local interest to be his prime responsibility. That same decisiveness and political leadership was exactly what Davis could not bring to the position and ultimately undermined the effectiveness of the government and the army. Following the war he showed the ability to adapt to difficult circumstances and re-appear as an effective political leader of the post-war south.66
How many confederates were able to see Lee as a "conceivable alternative" to the two Johnston's or Beauregard in April 1862? Calls of "granny Lee" and "evacuating Lee" make clear that there was no general enthusiasm for Lee's abilities when he took command.67 Davis also showed no great confidence in Jackson even after his success in the Valley in 1862. In spite of this opinion, Jackson's position as among the most able commanders of the war is clearly established. Men like McClellan and Beauregard began with high reputations but events proved their abilities as disappointing as they were surprising and even today inexplicable. General Zachary Taylor said that A.S. Johnston was the "best soldier" he ever saw but historians today find it difficult to confirm such high regard for his abilities.68
We can not really say that any of these men would have been more effective than Davis. The notion that there were no "conceivable alternatives" seems to have more to do with the limitations of historians than the quality of men available. There is little question that very few northerners in 1860 would have guessed at the historic stature of Lincoln one hundred years on?
Finally, from all the foregoing points it appears that the military issues, did in fact, largely determine the war's outcome. In particular, the frequent and bitter quarreling within the highest levels of the Confederate command system clearly produced repeated failures in handling the requirements of military strategy and leadership. In fact, southern leaders showed equal determination and energy in pressing disputes amongst themselves as they demonstrated against their northern opponents.