Part 1
Just as the Civil War is now viewed as the central event of American history, the reason for ultimate Southern defeat is central to Civil War historiography. Among the first to deal with one of the key elements of Confederate defeat is Frank Vandiver in Rebel Brass. Vandiver approaches the problem by attempting to answer two large questions: 1) was the Confederate command system adequate to the requirements it faced? 2) Did the South lose the war because the command system failed? To manage such large issues within a relatively small work, he structures these questions into three major themes: first as a problem of national defense; second as a problem of administration; third as viewed from the area of logistics. Vandiver does not intend to make a definitive study but simply provide an introduction with a focus toward the Confederate command system. Early in his work, Vandiver identifies six major factors that influenced or created special problems for the Confederate Government. Although perhaps beyond his intent, this list serves as one of the first well founded compilations of the major factors contributing to the outcome of the war.
The key factors as derived by Vandiver are: 1) Geography, 2) Manpower, 3) Leadership, 4) Economy, 5) Southern attitudes, and 6) Communications1. A look forward to later work finds that most of the scholarship on the reasons for the outcome of the war follows the pattern set by Vandiver. David Donald's collection of five essays in Why the North Won the Civil War include themes on; manpower and economy, military leadership, diplomacy, democracy in the south, and Jefferson Davis' role as president. The issue of Davis' role is essentially a question of leadership directed at a specific individual. Though differences in interpretation of the key factors are apparent, it is the similarities between these two approaches that are most striking. Only the theme of diplomacy is new to the second approach. It is also interesting to see that manpower and economic difficulties have been brought together under one heading.2
Some years later Luddwell Johnson's essay "Civil War Military History: a Few Revisions in Need of Revising", in John Hubbell's collection Battles Won and Lost, treats five major factors in the final Northern victory. Johnson lists the following as major contributing factors: 1) Confederate dispersed defensive, 2) no overall strategic direction in the south, 3) poor southern leadership, 4) Southern localism and 5) superior leadership of Grant and Lincoln.3 These five actually fall into two of the groups seen above; leadership and southern localism or attitudes. Though expanding the leadership issue into more detailed subcategories, this treatment is largely consistent with the two previous patterns.
In one of the more recent discussions of the key elements of ultimate victory or defeat, James McPherson in Battle Cry of Freedom addresses four general areas: 1) manpower and economy, 2) internal southern divisions, 3) failure of southern will, 4) quality of leadership. Three of these four fall directly into the pattern seen above. Only the issue of southern will introduces a new element to the problem.4 A compendium of these four approaches to the problem of assessing the cause of Confederate defeat yields the following list:
1) Geography (1; times cited)
2) Manpower/economy (3)
3) Leadership (4)
4) Internal divisions (4)
5) Diplomacy (1)
6) Will to win (1)
The singular aspect of this list is that three factors clearly stand out as playing major parts in determining the outcome of the war.
After identifying the key elements influencing the war's outcome, Vandiver addresses each within themes of command, administration and logistics. In the area of manpower and economy, Vandiver's assessment is that problems of manpower allocation and resource distribution were never solved. Although southern manpower resources were limited, he shows how shortages resulted mainly from poor coordination and cooperation between state and central government authorities as well as within the Confederate Government itself.5 With respect to economic resources and production he points out that although tremendous problems were encountered, the Confederate government managed to provide the essentials to the field armies up to the last days of the war. He also shows that shortages occurred mainly among the civil population and largely because of inadequate transport facilities and coordination.6
In the area of Confederate command and strategy, Vandiver stops short of laying blame on Jefferson Davis. He is sympathetic in recognizing errors committed by Confederate leadership and maintains his criticism within the context of historical circumstances. He acknowledges Davis' limitations and mistakes but judges that Davis made a heroic and stubborn attempt to solve problems and provide leadership. Vandiver points out that a general lack of cooperation among Confederate generals and civilian authorities alike somewhat extenuate Davis' performance. He confirms that the level of experience and knowledge possessed by most Confederate leaders was generally greater than that of their Union counterparts and should have been adequate under most situations. He makes the point that this experience may have been a drawback. The extreme conservatism among Confederate leaders became a handicap because of the many unprecedented problems and situations encountered during the war. In addition, Vandiver makes the point that poor communication facilities and failure of Confederate leadership to recognize the importance of communications was a major factor in Confederate command and strategy problems. He also states that the dispersed defensive strategy resulted from the belief among most Southerners that the war would be short.
On the role of Jefferson Davis in Confederate command and strategy Vandiver is again sympathetic. His assessment is that Davis was "not a bad leader.7 Due to conditions of political and military circumstances as well as Davis' own personality, he was either too slow or never quite understood how to solve the problems facing him. This would appear to be an essentially negative evaluation. Vandiver declines to make such a judgement. He succeeds in showing, however, that Davis did rely heavily on personal relationships when assessing both military and personnel issues.8 Davis was entirely dependent on a small inner circle of trusted friends as his key advisors. This resulted in Davis' inability to delegate authority.9 He also saw himself as experienced and capable in military matters. Therefore, he was slow to admit mistakes and adopt new ideas from people outside of his trusted inner circle.
Vandiver admits that the Confederate Departmental System was largely Davis' own device. He also recognizes that this system was largely ineffective and probably not appropriate to the circumstances facing the Confederacy.10 Vandiver states that Davis' slowness in trying to change the departmental system was based on the feeling that there were no able men available to make an alternative system practical. In the end, Vandiver raises the question of internal divisions as the key element of Confederate defeat.11 He does not attempt to answer this question but points out that opposing views and interests within the Confederacy influenced many of the problems of command and strategy.
David M. Potter's "Jefferson Davis and the Political Factors in Confederate Defeat", in Why the North Won the Civil War, assesses Davis' leadership less favorably. He largely agrees that Davis tended to aggravate problems instead of reduce them.12 Potter also recognizes that Confederate efforts labored under many severe handicaps of manpower and economy. He says however, that such difficulties were not as daunting as those of personal interest and personality- most especially Davis. He cites as examples the unwillingness to tax the people and reliance on issues of unbacked paper money; and failure to use cotton as a source of wealth to back the war effort.
Potter specifically addresses the issue of the quality of leadership provided by Davis. He concludes that a good deal of the blame for Confederate defeat may be attributed to Davis.13 He is cognizant that many Confederate political and military leaders could have been more cooperative with Davis, but says Davis himself was balky at times. Potter is highly critical of Davis in three areas: in relations with the people; in the conception of his own role as president; and his role in developing Confederate strategy.14
Potter contrasts Davis with Lincoln to show differences in how they approached relations with other leaders. He points out Lincoln's willingness to include many men representing a variety of interests in his cabinet. Davis maintained relations with only two men, Lee and Juda P. Benjamin, who were both trusted and first rate problem solvers. These men were keenly aware of Davis' touchy personality and spent much time and energy practicing tactful persuasion in their work with him. Davis also proved unable to form new relations when his trusted advisors showed themselves unequal to their assignments. In his relations with the Confederate people, Davis failed because of an inability to tolerate criticism and in explaining the essential vision of what had to be done to win and why.15
Here Potter is strongly supported by the work of Grady McWhiney. In his biography of Braxton Bragg, McWhiney shows how the contentious relations of Davis with nearly all of the highest-ranking confederate officers overwhelmed many important strategic decisions. Just as Davis was unable to admit the limitations of his friend Braxton Bragg, he was equally frustrated in developing a productive relationship with General Joe Johnston. General Beauregard was consistently excluded from consultations on strategy purely because of the personal dislike of Davis and Bragg. The positions of Generals Polk and Pemberton were maintained largely because of their past associations with Davis.16
In Confederate strategy Potter shows how Davis' basic limitations were increased by his feeling that he was competent and knowledgeable in military affairs. This was the reason why he insisted in serving as his own chief of staff and Secretary of War. In fact, all men serving, nominally, in that cabinet post showed a marked lack of initiative, largely because they were aware that Davis could not tolerate it.17 This insistence resulted in Davis losing sight of the major problems facing the Confederate command system. Potter cites the appraisal of Robert G. H. Kean, a Richmond official, that Davis had no practical military knowledge. He also cites the example of Davis himself writing an order detailing a private to a work party.18 It appears that Davis spent much time working on matters that were properly the business of clerks. Potter agrees with Vandiver that the Confederate Departmental System was an arrangement derived from the overall conception of Davis himself. He goes further saying that it was a practice that Davis carried with him from his days as Secretary of War under President Pierce.19
Davis’ personality was simply not suited to providing neither the requisite leadership nor the need for timely thoughtful decision making.20 Davis was responsible for achieving victory. He created the structure of command that relied on himself as de-facto Secretary of War, Chief of Staff and Commander In Chief. “Davis made the decision early on” for a broad territorial defense instead of a flexible defense based on maneuver and initiative as envisioned by Lee and others.21 The two alternative strategies of greatest potential are represented by the contrasting concepts of Davis and Lee. One, the strategy of avoiding defeat by prolonged static defense on broad front – Davis. The other, to seek decisive victory in the short term - Lee.22 Fundamental difference between Davis and Lee was in strategy; Davis for defensive and Lee for strategy of seeking decisive end early in the war before Union economic & manpower strength were fully developed.23
Both by personality and behavior Davis proved to many observers that he was vacillating and insular in decision making and frosty and self-righteous in personal relations to many men whose own personnel contribution were both useful and necessary to effective operations and strategy.24 Davis’ maintenance of General Cooper as Adjutant General and Inspector General of the Confederate Army, in spite of the early recognition that he was “fit for nothing more than peacetime routine” duty, showed that Davis had “dismally misjudged” Cooper’s ability. Davis then compounded the error by failure to provide an able replacement because of his own inability to admit to the weakness of his friends.25 Confederate Commissary General L. B. Northrop proved to be grossly inefficient but he continued to hold the position because his friend Jefferson Davis supported him.25 Davis’ failure to enforce discipline among senior commanders repeatedly undermined confederate strategy and command control.27
Davis’ appointment of Polk ignored the fact that he had no military qualifications beyond being one of Davis’ oldest friends.28 Polk showed himself to be unreliable and disobedient from the very beginning yet Davis never attempted to enforce ordinary military discipline in the Army of Tennessee.29 Davis failed to take action to deal with Polk’s disastrous action and deal effectively with confederate military policy on Kentucky.30
Polk’s statement to a subordinate that Bragg was to be feared as much as Rosecrans shows the rotten core of the confederate high command that was nursed by Davis’ indecision and inability to recognize the unavoidable outcome of allowing insubordination to ferment within the highest command level of the Confederate army.31 The ultimate responsibility for the refusal of Bragg’s corps commanders to follow his orders to attack Thomas’ isolated corps on September 10, 1863 near Chattanooga falls on Davis. His failure to remedy the disobedient and unreliable habits of Polk and the other balky generals in the army of Tennessee sowed the seed for the bitter fruit of defeat at Chattanooga and beyond.32 Davis allowed personal relationships to fog his judgment about both necessary strategic decisions and the commanders to carry them out. He repeatedly “neglected to straighten out the mess in the Army of Tennessee officer corps.”33
Davis’ personal intervention during the fall and winter of 1862-63 contributed to the ill-defined strategy and misallocation of troops in Mississippi and Tennessee and the ultimate loss of both states by September 1863.34 At a distance in Richmond Davis failed to understand the critical strategic situation at Vicksburg.35 Davis provided the decisive blow resulting in “Pemberton’s undoing” when he gave conflicting instructions to remain at Vicksburg instead of following Johnston’s order to save the troops and temporarily withdraw from Grant’s trap.36
Even without Davis’ meddling Pemberton’s performance was lumbering and ineffective.37 The Vicksburg and Pemberton examples “reflect poorly” on Davis as to his capacity for strategic understanding, decision making in critical situations and ability to judge the performance of senior commanders. Taken together this must be a decidedly negative judgment on Davis’ own performance and ability.38 The loss of Vicksburg resulted mainly from faulty confederate decision making and clumsy leadership.39
Davis’ strategy in the spring and summer of 1863 proved to be a confused and ineffective jumble of Davis’ own broad front defensive with Lee’s more aggressive strategy of taking the initiative to create a decisive defeat of the Army of the Potomac. The result was two campaigns decisively lost; Gettysburg and Vicksburg.40 Davis’ personal selection of Hood to command the final stage of the Atlanta campaign proved to be an ineffective choice made too late.41
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