Part 2
Many may say that it is not true that Lee or Jackson were superior to Grant, Sherman, Thomas or Sheridan. If so, "why did the North win?" What's more, Jackson only succeeded against "inferior political" union generals. Yet, Lee and Jackson had perhaps achieved their greatest surprise against the Union Army commanded by General Joe Hooker at Chancellorsville in May 1863. General Hooker had shown himself to be one of the Union's most determined commanders from the Seven Days battles to Fredricksburg. He later went west and played a key role in the decisive Union victory at Chattanooga. Hooker was a Westpoint graduate and Mexican War veteran. Among Union generals who held Corps command, Hooker was neither political nor inferior. General John Pope, who was surprised and defeated by the Lee-Jackson team at Second Bull Run, was also a professional soldier. Up to the time he was transferred east to command the new Union Army of Virginia, he was in good standing among union western commanders. It was only at the hands of Lee and Jackson that Pope acquired the "inferior" reputation. But then most Union generals appeared inferior when put against Lee or Jackson. McClellan and Burnside who had each made reputations as competent and effective commanders simply appeared to melt away when subjected to the fast and heated action of a campaign against Lee and Jackson. But the reputation of Grant, Sherman et al is well entrenched. If Grant was not superior how did he win so many battles? So many battles? Grant's record is six wins out of thirteen battles. Jackson won nine of ten in just fourteen months time. Grant was in almost continuous command from February 1862 to the end of the war, a total of 38 months. Up to May of 1863 when Jackson was killed, Grant had just 3 major actions to his credit. One of these, Shiloh, was a near career ending debacle which Grant managed to survive by the grace of confederate overconfidence and timely reinforcements. When Grant was made Union General-in-Chief in March 1864 he had just two more major actions on his record, Vicksburg Campaign and Chattanooga. Perhaps Grant's sole qualification for the Chief command was that he survived the first three years campaigning. In May 1864, with about twice the forces as Lee, Grant attempted a succession of turning movements. Lee blocked each in turn, prompting Grant to make protracted but futile assaults against confederate entrenchments. Within six weeks Grant had lost over 60,000 men, nearly equal to Lee's whole army.8 The attrition strategy was then invented to justify Grant's failure to gain any substantial advantage in spite of enormous losses. This notwithstanding the fact that Lees’ army had been significantly weakened by the loss of Jackson and 27,000 men at Gettysburg the previous summer. The result also found instances of Union Corps and Brigade commanders refusing to follow attack orders;9 and the severe loss of morale among the Northern population to the extent that Lincoln foresaw his own potential political defeat. Lincoln was ultimately saved by Sherman's capture of Atlanta.10 How did Grant finally defeat Lee? With Union forces spread across the south from Arkansas to North Carolina and Sherman's army in his rear, Lee surrendered to save any useless loss of life.
Many take Lee's surrender in April 1865 to mean that Grant succeeded in destroying the Army of Northern Virginia through attrition, thus vindicating Grant's losses. Yet, just prior to the evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg Lee's effective force was about 40,000 infantry and artillery. This is a 20 to 30 percent reduction from Lee's available strength when Grant began his operations in Virginia the year before.11 This seems hardly the level of attrition to be expected to support a claim of destruction. Particularly so, in light of the enormous losses suffered by Union troops to attain such a modest reduction over nearly a year of virtually uninterrupted campaigning. In fact, the very rapid deterioration in Lee's army became apparent only after he evacuated Richmond. It was really the moral and political impact of this retreat that ruined the cohesion in Lee's army, resulting in poor morale, massive desertion and supply shortages in the last days. The whole notion that the Confederate Army was destroyed by combat losses is difficult to support in light that there had been some 200,000 forces available up to the time of Lee's surrender.12 Because many of these forces rapidly evaporated soon after the evacuation of Richmond, it is generally concluded that these were attrition losses. Yet, very little fighting occurred after Lee's surrender. Attrition losses would properly be considered as closely related to specific combat actions. Thus, the widespread desertion and lost cohesion occurring as the result of the Union Capture of Richmond must be seen as morale and political losses. It should also be remembered that even at peak strength the Confederate Army numbered little more than 250,000 effective men in the field.13 It is generally stated that Grant's strategy aimed at the destruction of Confederate forces. While the success of this attrition seems questionable, there is little doubt of the important moral and political effects that occurred after the capture of key territorial objectives. Prior to the Union capture of Richmond four key military turning points are generally recognized; Gettysburg, capture of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Chattanooga and the fall of Atlanta.14 Three of these four represent classic territorial points of strategic importance. It is clear that the mere presence of any sizeable enemy force at these points, (Vicksburg, Chattanooga and Atlanta) let alone specific material effects of their capture, would substantially impact the cohesion and morale of the Confederate troops as well as the general political viability of the government. The key factor that is apparently overlooked by most historians is the underlying economic-political foundation of the Confederacy. Cities like New Orleans, Nashville, Memphis, Mobile, Atlanta and Savannah were the major population and economic centers that provided the material and political power to Southern field armies. Add to this the fall of Richmond and the result is entirely consistent with defeat caused by enemy occupation of key territorial objectives.15
Lee often receives criticism as a strategist, that his view and ability were limited and unimaginative.16 Yet, his strategy from the Seven Days to Chancellorsville resulted in military success unprecedented in American History.17 It is often suggested that he should have recommended a different strategy for the western campaigns and been willing to send a portion of his army to the west as reinforcements for confederate forces there. From June 1862 to January 1865 Lee was commander of the ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA and not the commander of all southern armies. It simply begs the question to say he ought to have performed the Herculean task of commanding the Virginia armies successfully as he did, while also assuming a major role in the overall strategic direction of all other theaters as well. Rather than a negative, it speaks well of his judgment and military ability that he understood the limitations and inadvisability of attempting to command forces from a distance- a classic error committed by military amateurs. What's more, had he attempted such a policy it would only have been a continuation of President Davis' policy of vesting himself with powers of general-in-chief and chief of staff, then attempting to control western armies from Richmond. This is exactly the reason Davis and General Joe Johnston were unable to work together.18 Johnston harbored great resentment at being placed in a position of command while being expected to except direction from Davis in Richmond. The Vicksburg campaign is a clear example of the error of commanding at a distance. All of this shows clearly the unsoundness in condemning Lee for his supposed failure and inability to direct the war according to an unsound policy.
General Jackson's record and performance is apparently even more misunderstood than is Lee. Because of a focus on the Contest between Grant and Lee recent scholarship has minimized Jackson's contribution and ability. Modern writers frequently dismiss him as a gifted and fanatical eccentric. According to one recent assessment Jackson is written off as "sadly deficient in administrative and political acumen,” and is therefore relegated to the position of a second class commander.19 Yet, this same Jackson independently and successfully commanded "one of the most brilliant operations of military history"- the Valley Campaign.20 Jackson was partly responsible for training and organizing a substantial part of the new Virginia volunteers at Harper's Ferry in the spring of 1861.21 That he succeeded in this sizable task of administration and management is borne out in the performance of his own brigade at the battle of 1st Bull Run. When Davis, through Secretary Benjamin, interfered in Jackson's operations in western Virginia in the winter of 1861-62, he showed his political acumen and moral courage by resigning his command and then registering his objection with Johnston and Davis. The Confederate government thereby learned an important lesson in military command and administration.22 One area of criticism is Jackson's relationship with General A. P. Hill. The major points of dispute were Jackson's tendency to secretiveness and Hill's assertion that Jackson had not the right to issue orders directly to Hill's brigades. In Freeman's objective and authoritative treatment of these points the only sustained criticism is that, Jackson refused to yield his rights as corps commander.23 That he was vigorous in maintaining the security of his operations and used his position as corps commander to direct operations in person when Hill was absent ought to be counted in his favor. Here also, Jackson is criticized for exercising exactly the opposite command personality from Lee's. There is a clear double standard when Lee is assessed negatively for giving too much discretion to subordinates, while Jackson is rated negatively for being a "difficult and demanding" corps Commander. What also is ignored here is that while an army commander may often find it necessary to allow his corps commanders some latitude and judgement in dealing with unexpected situations, a corps commander must make more detailed and specific requirements on his subordinates in order to successfully execute the larger tactical plan.
That Jackson succeeded in independently conducting an operation of three months time, and embracing an area 130 x 60 miles; requiring provision of rations, forage, and transportation for a force of over 15,000 troops is a clear indication of his administrative and management ability.24 Frank Vandiver concluded, "activities of Jackson’s quartermaster were key to success" in the Valley Campaign.25 Freeman can again be cited to confirm Jackson's stature among Civil War commanders. In his introduction to the second volume of Lee's Lieutenants he writes, "his (Jackson) are the most shining of the Army's achievements" from Cedar Mountain to Chancellorsville; and Jackson "won success as an independent commander" in the Antietam Campaign.26.
Jackson of the Chickahominy is sometimes cited to show his limited ability. That Jackson failed to display the same energy and grasp of the strategic situation during the Seven Days battle is almost beyond question. Whether his subpar leadership in this action should largely overwhelm Jackson's subsequent performance appears far from justifiable. From Freeman and the work of Jackson's biographers the three basic sources of his lethargy can be well established. First, the fact that Jackson and the entire Valley army were tired and near worn out is well documented. Just days before Jackson's planned attack against Sumner at Mechanicsville, the Valley army had been operating against Shields and Fremont over 100 miles distant. The forced march toward Richmond had only partly been made by rail. What's more, the previous eight weeks had seen constant marching and fighting in the Valley. From April 17th to June 25th Jackson’s little Valley Army of but 15,000 had fought four battles, six skirmishes, and covered some 600 miles while marching 48 of 68 days, 7 of 10.27 Second, the Peninsula was unfamiliar to Jackson, his staff and commanders. He had used superior knowledge of the Shennandoah Valley to great advantage against Banks, Shields and Fremont. In the Seven Days battle Jackson was wholly dependent on unfamiliar local guides in conducting his marches. In battle it was necessary to scout carefully and extensively to piece together any tactical situation. Jackson and his staff were unaware of local crossings and fords, which might offer a quick by-pass of enemy river positions.28 Third, Lee's army had simply out grown its organization based on independent divisions and brigades. Frequent confusion and delay in the operations of all commands was typical throughout the Seven Days Battle. For the Seven Days Battle Lee’s army was made up of three full divisions, four undersized divisions, two adhoc “commands”, and one unattached brigade. With no Corps level command structure Lee and his staff had to manage each of the units individually. It was up to the several division commanders to make arrangements to cooperate and conform to other confederate divisions nearby. In the event this proved to be impractical. Lee’s staff was small and entirely new. That Lee, Longstreet and Jackson had within a year been promoted from regimental command to leading ten to twenty thousand men, and at the same time improvising all staff work, clearly contributed to a number of missed opportunities in the Peninsula.29
Today the stature of these four American commanders is in part due to the renown of the historian who has most championed their cause. In the case of Grant, British General J.F.C. Fuller and well-known historians T. Harry Williams and Bruce Catton are the main advocates.30 Sherman is well represented by a formidable B.H. Liddell-Hart.31 None other than the foremost of Southern war historians, Douglas Southall Freeman, has carried the flag of R.E. Lee in a massive and highly acclaimed biography.32 In contrast, the traditional biography of Jackson, by British Colonel G.F.R. Henderson, is often regarded as a quaint, romantic, at times eulogistic and dated work. What's more Henderson's other work is all but unknown to most American scholars. More recent biographies of Jackson by Lenoir Chambers, Frank Vandiver, and Burke Davis are generally regarded as highly competent works but not of the first order in literary or scholarly impact.33 Only Vandiver, of these three, has achieved a broader acclaim as Civil War Scholar. Burke Davis is well known as a writer of general and popular works on the civil war. The work on Jackson by Lenoir Chambers is regarded as the superior of these three works, in particular because of the balanced and objective work on Jackson's ante-bellum life. The latest biography of Jackson, by James I. Robertson, jr., has undoubtedly become the standard and most valuable work on Jackson’s life.34 In summary, although a balanced review of the records of the four best known commanders shows marked superiority in Jackson's record, present scholarship tends to show higher regard for the abilities of Grant, Sherman and Lee; in spite of the record and in large part attributable to the status of the historical advocate of each commander.
An obvious criticism of this evaluation is that such a quantitative approach can not account for many of the finer points necessary in understanding the operational arts. While we can recognize some truth in this point it does not appear to be a strong enough criticism to largely invalidate much of the value of this evaluation. In the alterative, many writers have attempted subjective analytical approaches to evaluate the relative quality of leadership and command performance of important civil war generals. Subjective analysis has the weakness of no specific criterion as a control or reference for comparison. The result is, generally, that evaluations based on subjective analysis ultimately are little more than well informed opinions but offer little to explain the essential factors culminating in decisive military events. In deed, the typical subjective analysis results in circular explanations that fail to look at a commander’s actions and focus on character and reputation. A quantitative analysis is at least neutral in its results and therefore avoids circular rationalization to square the evaluation with the perceived character of the subject. Subjective analysis typically relies on ill-defined terms like “incompetent”, “modern”, “innovative”, “common sense” and etc.. As a result, the subjective analysis approach may actually confuse rather than clarify our understanding of command performance.
Clearly, this evaluation of tactical performance lacks depth in analysis and therefore is only an initial effort to understand command performance of civil war generals. It offers a substantially different starting point from the accepted scholarship based on subjective analysis. Since a quantitative analysis is based on well known and verifiable data the burden of reconciling inconsistencies between the two approaches requires subjective analysis based on specific and well defined criteria. The art of subjective analysis clearly requires considerable improvement to meet this standard. Until sound and reliable subjective analysis are available this evaluation offers an objective alternative.
Top
Union & Confederate Commanders
Summary Tactical Performance
Summary and Comparision
NOTES
WORKS CITED
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