PART 2 - WEAPONS EFFECTS & TACTICS
From the American Revolution to the Mexican war, frontal attacks gainst prepared defenders were bloody affairs. This was largely true independent of the weapon, whether flintlock musket or percussion rifle.1 Tactics in the civil war were largely unchanged from the pattern for the preceding fifty years. While volunteer soldiers would often go to ground or break into small groups when trying to advance, the basic formation remained close files with lines close behind. There was simply no other way for the captain or colonel to control his troops in action.2 By the mid 1800’s Rifled weapons for both infantry and artillery were well developed. Breech-loading artillery had also seen major improvements. Yet, the practical range and tactics remained largely unchanged since targets could not be engaged beyond the limits of the line-of-sight. Dupuy recognized the continuous use of linear tactics throughout the 19th century in Europe and the United States. Even at the end of the Franco-Prussian War, the linear tactics of Gustavas Adolphus were still in vogue, for commanders still had no other way to exercise control. Thus despite a truly revolutionary change in weapons effects, the resulting changes in tactics were evolutionary and could not have been otherwise.3
American Civil War armies proved to be smaller, while the trend was for larger armies; had fewer guns, while the trend was for more guns; and campaigns less intense than the Napoleonic wars while the general trend toward modern wars was for greater numbers etc. The American Civil War was neither the first modern war nor tactically more modern than earlier European wars.4
(see table 1)The armies fighting in Mexico, 1846, the Crimea, 1854, and Italy, 1859, were more like those fighting under Fredrick II or Napoleon than twentieth century armies. No revolution in tactics had occurred before 1860.5 In fact, many so-called inovations in the civil war had really started in Europe some years earlier. The Civil War was less modern than transitional.6 Modern writers tend to view the war from the modern prspective and therefore recognize the modern fringe elements while missing the pre-modern core values of the men and institutions that lived and fought the war. Soldiers of that day often found the idea of seeking cover and concealment shameful. Before men can fight a modern war they must accept the modern concept of war being killing without honor, war not to defeat the enemy field forces but to destroy the political foundation of the opposing army. The end of reconstruction showed that the old south’s political structure remained largely intact with slightly modified economic structure.7 In both weapons and institutions, the U.S. army did not achieve modern character until after 1900. The year 1903 had come before the army had the rudiments of a general staff and had adopted the modern magazine Springfield rifle patterned after the Mauser. In Cuba during the Spanish American war the American artillery were armed with obsolete blackpowder pieces.8
The most direct defense of the Modern/total war thesis is found in On the Road to Total War edited by Stig Forster and Jorg Nagler in 1997. While a number of contributors support the Modern/total war thesis several contributions strongly refute it. This volume includes a revised printing of Mark Neely’s, "Was the Civil War a Total War?", which serves as the opening for the volume. James McPherson, in “From Limited War to Total War in America,” is one of the writers supporting the Modern/total war thesis. McPherson’s defense engages in questionable analysis by blurring the distinction of civilian and soldier deaths when citing the scale of conflict and numbers of soldiers lost and the size of armies. He carefully avoids comparison with the Thirty Years war where 3-4 million Germans were killed over and above any military losses.9 McPherson finally equivocates by saying, “the kind of war the civil war became merits the label of total war.” This is not the question. The thesis as stated by Walters and Williams et al. is that the Civil War was the first Modern Total War. We may accept that by this equivocation McPherson concedes that this thesis is wrong.10
Earl Hess’s essay, "Tactics,Trenches, and Men in the Civil War", states that tactical formations remained unchanged in the Civil War; the battle line was the same standard two ranks standing shoulder to shoulder.11 New tactics became possible only when men were armed with breech loading magazine rifles. He concludes that it is “inaccurate to term civil war the first modern war. It was essentially an old-fashioned war.”12 Michael Fellman in “At the Nihilist edge: Reflection on Guerilla Warfare during the American Civil War” states that as a test of modern war, civil war violence did not approach that of the Thirty Years War. He agrees with the comparison that the 3 to 4 million civilians killed of the twenty million population of Germany are on a completely different scale as seen in the Civil War.13 He further cites the example of a Union raid on Missouri in 1863 that provoked such an outcry that the practice of indiscriminate raiding was never repeated.14
The offering by Richard Current, “From Civil War to World Power: Perceptions and Realities”, states the United States had not industrialized to modern level by the civil war.15 He further states hat the civil war actually delayed progress toward modern economic development.16 The essay by Engerman and Gallman in "The Civil War Economy: a Modern View", shows that the mobilization of wartime economy was greater in the Confederacy than in the “modernized” Union. The northern economy was not stretched by the war effort but that the war economy was easily absorbed into the prewar business cycle.17
A recent and significant source confirms the traditional tactical experience in the civil war. Brent Nosworthy in The Bloody Crucible of Courage makes several points confirming the old tactical nature of civil war battles. He states that the trajectory of the rifled musket made it impractical in combat to adjust sights for ranges beyond 2-300 yards.18 The effect of the new weapon was limited since little effort was made to train soldiers to aim the rifled musket. Thus, fire was exchanged at generally closer ranges than the proving ground range of 600 yards.19 Nosworthy’s study also confirmed Paddy Griffith’s estimate in Battle Tactics of the Civil War of 141 yards for average civil war volleys.20 He demonstrates that average range for engagements was slightly greater than earlier wars but much less than claimed by some writers21
Nosworthy finds that a number of battles showed the tendency for dense column attacks in the pattern of the Napoleonic wars.22 He shows that a majority of the tactical methods used during the civil war “fell squarely” within existing military practice.23 He admits that many civil war authors mistakenly attributed a number of “first in kind” developments to the civil war that had already been introduced in Europe.24 He shows why following the civil war it was “not unnatural” for European tacticians to conclude that variations were minor.25
Ultimately, Nosworthy concludes that civil war engagements were fought at ranges not much greater than previous wars and the rifled musket had much less effect on tactics than is often claimed.26 He also states that mortar boats, telegraph, ironclad and torpedoes were all used in the Crimean War.27 He concludes that until about 1866 when the Prussian army changed their system making the company the basic tactical unit, no general trend away from linear tactics can be found.28
American Civil war tactics of the 1864 campaign in Virginia are often held up as examples of the tactical revolution in the Civil War. An examination of tactics as portrayed in the Official Records, Arthur Wagner’s Organization and Tactics, and the Westpoint Atlas of American wars, Vol. 1 conflicts with that assessment. Some historians claim that the battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House in Virginia in 1864 are examples of new tactics because troops sometimes broke up into small groups to take advantage of cover. The tactical accounts actually show that major attacks were made in large dense columns reminiscent of the Napoleonic Wars and not in smaller less dense formations seen in modern infiltration tactics as claimed by some writers. Wagner makes clear in his account in Organization and Tactics that Hancock’s 2nd Corps attack at Spotsylvania, May 12, 1864, was made in a large dense column comprising troops of his entire corps. (fig.1 & 2)
This attack arrayed some 20,000 men in close columns deployed over about 800x200 yards. This makes for 25 men per yard of frontage. Upton’s division in this battle is often cited as an example of innovative tactics. His force comprised some 4600 men over 600x450 yards with density of about 8 men per yard of frontage. This formation while being less dense was still clearly based on the close column formation typical of the linear tactics era.(fig.3 & 4) (fig.5 & 6)
In comparison with the attack of d’Erlon’s Corps at Waterloo, June 18, 1815, the French disposed about 13,000 men over about 650x90 yards or about 20 men per yard of front. Clearly, the Spotsylvania attack was of very similar density and formation as the Waterloo attack. Rather than being an innovation, Hancock’s attack was a repetition of the French tactics used to make up for the quality of troops by using very dense formations. Other examples of the French tactical formations show generally much less front density than the attack at Spotsylvania. The French attack by Morand’s Division at the battle of Borodino against the Great Redoubt, September 15, 1812, was made with a density of 36 men per yard of frontage. However, this was made by a much smaller force of about 3200 men deployed over about 1200x75 yards.(fig.7 & 8) (fig.9 & 10) (fig. 11 & 12)
NOTES PART 2
PART 2b - TACTICS
PART 3 - ENTRENCHMENTS
PART 4 - BOER TACTICS
PART 5 - RAILROADS
PART 6 - CIVILIAN VIOLENCE
PART 7 - DRAFT
List of figures and tables
WORKS CITED
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