COUNTER-FACTUAL ANALYSIS
A prime example of counter-factual analysis as a valid tool of historical research comes from the distinguished civil war historian Allan Nevins in his The War for the Union: the Organized War 1863-1864. In his chapter titled “Vicksburg: the Organized Victory” we find the following on page 56:
Could the South have held the Mississippi if it had centered its main energies upon the task? Probably it could, if a number of posts between Island No. 10 and Port Hudson had been energetically fortified and provisioned; if a powerful mobile army had been kept intact under one bold general; and if this army had been given timely strength by reinforcement from Virginia and from Arkansas. Effective defensive measures could have been taken, but the necessity was not always clear, and in taking such measures the Confederacy would have weakened other areas. The country was full of provisions; it had insufficient transport to be sure, but determined and resourceful officers, moving in time, could have accumulated enough salt-pork, corn, beans, rice, sugar and molasses to feed garrisons in Vicksburg, Port Gibson, and Port Hudson for long periods. The river was as much a natural barrier for defense as a natural avenue for invasion. Effectively fortified to prevent the passages of boats – unarmed transports steaming down, slow moving ironclads struggling upstream – it would have proved a valuable bulwark. The people of the lower valley felt strongly that the defense of New Orleans has been bungled; that it should never have been possible for Farragut to make so easy a conquest. They felt outraged that the Confederate flotilla at Memphis should have been so swiftly annihilated.
Again on page 59 he assesses Pemberton’s actions in counter factual terms:
Had Pemberton acted instantly on this order, he might have effected a junction with Johnston somewhere near Clinton, and helped preserve the mobility of the joint force. Instead, he called a council of war, showed them the message and argued at length against obeying it. A majority of the council voted for accepting the orders, and a minority wished to strike at the communications of the advancing Union forces. Pemberton unwillingly adopted the latter plan. Johnston, however, was at this moment forced out of Jackson by Grant’s brief occupation of the place, and when he directed Pemberton on the 15th to move directly to Clinton for a junction, his orders were betrayed to Grant.
These two examples are perhaps dispositive of the value and validity of counter-factual analysis as a tool of historical narrative.